INTRODUCTION
This Annual Human Rights Lecture 1 provides a timely occasion to consider the developing case-law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Established in 1979, once the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights entered into force in 1978, the Court has now attained its maturity, with the regular and ever increasing exercise of the advisory as well as contentious functions conferred upon it by the American Convention. The Court, entrusted with the interpretation and application of the Convention, has constructed a case-law which is now the juridical patrimony of the countries and peoples of the American continent. This case-law consists, to date, of 17 Advisory Opinions, and 98 Judgments (on preliminary objections, competence, merits, reparations, and interpretation of judgments) concerning 41 cases, as well as provisional measures of protection pertaining to 38 separate cases. It is my intention, in the present study, to single out some of the most significant aspects to date of the developing case-law of the Inter-American Court.
May it preliminarily be recalled that the conventional basis for the exercise of the Court's advisory jurisdiction is distinct from that for the exercise of its contentious jurisdiction. The basis for the exercise of the former is particularly wide, given that, under Article 64 of the American Convention, all OAS member States (whether Parties to the American Convention or not) and all of the main organs mentioned in Chapter X of the OAS Charter can request advisory opinions from the Court on matters regarding 'the interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American states' or, in the case of member states, 'the compatibility of any of its domestic laws with the aforesaid international instruments'.
For the exercise of the Court's contentious jurisdiction in cases concerning them, a declaration of acceptance is required from States Parties to the Convention under Article 62. The Court is entitled, by the American Convention itself (Article 63(2)), to order provisional measures of protection. In recent years, it has been developing a remarkable practice on such measures, disclosing the preventive dimension of its work of safeguarding the rights protected under the Convention.
It would be convenient, bearing these preliminary remarks in mind, to cover the development of the case-law of the Inter-American Court under the distinct headings In fact, only on one occasion so far (twelfth Advisory Opinion, Compatability of Draft Legislation with Article 8(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights, Series A 12 (1991); 13 HRLJ 149 (1992), has the Court decided not to answer the request, as in its view it could undermine the contentious jurisdiction and negatively affect the human rights of those who had formulated complaints before the Inter-American Commission. 8 Ibid., supra note 6, para. 57. The Court advised that a State Party may 'apply the death penalty to crimes for which such a penalty was not previously provided for under its domestic law' and that it may not make a reservation to Article 4(4) to allow it to do so. 9 
Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism,
IACtHR Series A 5 (1985); 7 HRLJ 74 (1986). 10 Ibid., para. 30. 11 Ibid., para. 33. The Court also considered that the question whether a limitation on freedom of expression is 'necessary to ensure' one of the objectives listed in Article 13(2)(a) and (b) of the American Convention must be judged 'by reference to the legitimate needs of democratic societies and institutions' (para. 42).
A.A.Cangado Trindade
reply or correction for inaccurate or offensive statements disseminated to the public in general. 16 It interpreted Article 14(1) of the American Convention as recognizing an 'internationally enforceable' right of reply or correction; when this latter is not enforceable under domestic law, the State at issue is under the obligation (under Article 2 of the Convention) to adopt the legislative or other measures that may be necessary to give effect to that right. 17 The Court further sustained that the fact that an Article of the Convention refers itself to the law is not sufficient to lose direct applicability, and observed that Article 14(1) of the Convention is directly applicable per se. 18 In its eighth Advisory Opinion (1987) , 19 the Court advised that the remedies of amparo and habeas corpus could not be suspended in accordance with Article 27(2) of the Convention, as they constituted 'indispensable judicial guarantees' to the protection of rights and freedoms which likewise could not be suspended according to the same provision. The Court, moreover, warned that the constitutional and legal provisions of the States Parties which authorize, explicitly or implicitly, the suspension of the remedies of amparo or habeas corpus in situations of emergency are to be regarded as incompatible with the international obligations which the Convention imposes upon those States, 20 given that the writs of habeas corpus and amparo are among those judicial remedies which are essential for the protection of non-derogable rights and for the preservation of legality in a democratic society.
Directly related to that Opinion is the following -the ninth -Advisory Opinion of the Court (1987) , 21 in which it expressed the opinion that the fact that the remedies were provided for by domestic law or were formally accessible was not sufficient: they should also be effective and adequate. In its view, Article 8 of the Convention does not contain a judicial remedy itself, but rather recognizes that due process is applicable essentially to all judicial guarantees referred to in the Convention. 22 It added that 'essential' judicial guarantees, not subject to derogation (Article 27(2)), include, besides habeas corpus and amparo, any other effective remedy before judges or competent tribunals (Article 25(1)) designed to guarantee respect of the rights whose suspension is not permitted by the Convention. Moreover, 'essential'judicial guarantees, not subject to suspension, include judicial procedures inherent in representative democracy as a form of government (Article 29(c)), designed to guarantee the full exercise of non-derogable rights, whose suppression or restriction entails the lack of protection of such rights. Those judicial guarantees, the Court concluded in its ninth Opinion, should be exercised within the framework and the principles of the due process of law (laid down in Article 8); and the measures taken by a government in a situation of emergency ought to count on judicial guarantees and be subject to a control of legality, so as to preserve the rule of law. In this way, in its eighth and ninth Advisory Opinions, the Court developed in its reasoning a realistic approach, taking into account the reality of the American continent, and insisting on the intangibility and prevalence of the judicial guarantees.
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In the tenth Advisory Opinion (1989), 24 the Court stated that it was authorized by Article 64(1) of the American Convention to render advisory opinions on the interpretation of the 1948 American Declaration, in the framework and within the limits of its competence in relation to the OAS Charter and the American Convention and other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American States.
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In the fourteenth Opinion (1994), 26 the Court sustained that the adoption, as well as the application, of a domestic law contrary to the obligations under the Convention is a violation of the latter, entailing the international responsibility of the State at issue; if an act pursuant to the application of such a law is an international crime, it generates the international responsibility not only of the State but also of the officials or agents who executed that act.
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In the eleventh Advisory Opinion (1990), 28 the Court examined the question of the circumstances surrounding the requirement of the exhaustion of local remedies (under Article 46 of the American Convention). This requirement was to be approached in a more flexible way than in other contexts, in the light of the specificity of the international protection of human rights, with the presumptions operating in favour of the alleged victims. The requirement of exhaustion, in this way, according to the Court, does not apply if, by reason of indigence or generalized fear of lawyers to represent him or her legally, a complainant before the Commission is rendered unable to exhaust or utilize local remedies necessary to protect a right guaranteed by the Convention.
Meanwhile, the doctrinal debate proceeds as to the desirable enlargement de lege ferenda of the nucleus of non-derogable rights, and the equally desirable precise regulation and control of states of emergency.
Interpretation of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, IACtHR Series A 10 (1989); 11 HRLJ 118 (1990). This was so because, according to the Court, the American Declaration contains and defines the human rights which the OAS Charter refers to, in such a way that one cannot interpret and apply the OAS Charter in the field of human rights without integrating its pertinent norms with the corresponding provisions of the Declaration, as results from the practice followed by the OAS organs.
International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the Convention (Articles I and 2, American Convention on Human Rights),
IACtHR Series A 14 (1994); 16 HRLJ 9 (1995); 2 IHRR 380 (1995). It remains to determine, as a step to be taken in the future, the individual responsibility (besides that of the State) in cases of violation of non-derogable rights (for example, the right to life, the right not to be subjected to torture or slavery, the right not to be incriminated by means of retroactive application of penalties). In its fifteenth Advisory Opinion (1997), 29 concerning the interpretation of Article 51 of the American Convention, the Court advised that the Inter-American Commission is not entitled to modify the opinions, conclusions and recommendations that the Commission has sent to the State at issue, except in exceptional circumstances, 30 and that under no circumstances can a third report be rendered by the Commission (as the American Convention contemplates only the reports under its Articles 50 and 51, respectively). Most significant was the Court's delivery of this Opinion despite the fact that the requesting State, Chile, had later withdrawn its request: the Court rightly found that this in no way affected its jurisdiction over the matter of which it had already been seized, and which had already been notified to all OAS member States and all organs mentioned in Chapter X of the OAS Charter. 31 This fifteenth Advisory Opinion thus touched the very foundations of the Court's advisory jurisdiction. Despite the oscillations in the position of the requesting State, the Court decided to retain jurisdiction over the matter it had been seized of, and delivered the Opinion. The Court's advisory jurisdiction -exercised to the benefit of all actors in the interAmerican system of protection as a whole -was thus greatly enhanced by this memorable fifteenth Advisory Opinion.
Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies
In its recent sixteenth Advisory Opinion (1999), 32 a most important one, the Court advised that Article 36 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations recognizes to a foreigner in detention individual rights, among which is the right to information on consular assistance, to which correspond duties incumbent upon the receiving State (irrespective of its federal or unitary structure). 33 The Court pointed out that the evolutive interpretation and application of the corpus juris of the International Law of Human Rights have had 'a positive impact on International Law in affirming and developing the aptitude of this latter to regulate the relations between States and human beings under their respective jurisdictions'; the Court thus adopted the 'proper approach' in considering the matter submitted to it in the framework of 'the evolution of the fundamental rights of the human person in contemporary International Law' , 34 The Court expressed the view that, for the due process of law to be preserved, 'a defendant must be able to exercise his rights and defend his interests effectively and in full procedural equality with other defendants' . 35 In order to attain its objectives, 'the judicial process must recognize and correct any real disadvantages' of those brought to court, 'thus observing the principle of equality before the law and the courts'.
36 Accordingly, the notification to persons deprived of their liberty abroad of 38 The non-observance or obstruction of the exercise of this right affects the guarantees to be secured in the judicial process. 39 The Court in this way linked the right at issue to the evolving guarantees of due process of law, and added that its non-observance in cases of the imposition and execution of the death penalty amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of the right to life itself (in the terms of and is having a noticeable impact on the practice of the States 42 of the region on the issue. It was the Advisory Opinion which has achieved the greatest level of intervention in its advisory proceedings (with eight intervening States, besides several non-governmental and individuals) in the whole history of the Court to date. 43 Most recently, the Inter-American Court has delivered its seventeenth Advisory Opinion (2002), on the Juridical Condition and the Human Rights of the Child.** The Court clarified the juridical personality that is ineluctably recognised by law to every human being (whether a child or an adolescent), irrespectively of his existential condition or the extent of his legal capacity to exercise his rights for himself (capacity of exercise). In fact, the recognition and the consolidation of the position of the human being as a full subject of the International Law of Human Rights constitutes, in our days, an unequivocal and eloquent manifestation of the advances of the current process of humanization of International Law itself (jus gentium).
As it can be seen, the Court's Advisory Opinions have helped to shed light on some central issues, of the utmost importance, concerning both the determination of the wide scope of the protected rights under the American Convention, and the operation of the inter-American system of human rights protection.
CASE-LAW IN THE EXERCISE OF THE CONTENTIOUS JURISDICTION
The development of the case-law of the Inter-American Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction in contentious matters can be conveniently considered in relation to its most significant substantive, as well as procedural, aspects. As to the former, attention will be focussed on the emerging case-law as to the meaning of the rights protected under the American Convention, and the reparation that is due as a consequence of their violation. In respect of the latter, attention will be turned to the key questions of access to justice at the international level, the basis of international jurisdiction, and the State's recognition of responsibility under the American Convention.
An examination of which goes beyond the purposes of the present paper. In the public hearings (on this sixteenth Advisory Opinion) before the Court, apart from the eight intervening States, several individuals took the floor, namely: seven individuals representatives of four national and international non-governmental organizations (active in the field of human rights), two individuals of a non-governmental organization working for the abolition of the death penalty, two representatives of a (national) entity of lawyers, four University Professors in their individual capacity, and three individuals in representation of a person condemned to death. Earlier on, in the proceedings pertaining to the fourth (1984) and the fifth (1985) Advisory Opinions, some individuals presented their viewpoints in the respective public hearings before the Court, in representation of institutions (public as well as of the press, respectively); the proceedings pertaining to the thirteenth Advisory Opinion resulted in the participation of four representatives of three non-governmental organizations; in the proceedings concerning the fourteenth Advisory Opinion, two members of nongovernmental organizations intervened; and those relating to the fifteenth Advisory Opinion led to the participation of the representatives of two non-governmental organizations. The first contentious cases in which the Inter-American Court established a violation of the right to life were those concerning disappearances in Honduras, viz. the Velasquez Rodriguez (1988) 45 and Godinez Cruz (1989) 46 cases. The contribution of the two Judgments of the Court on the merits in those cases consisted in having elaborated on the triple duty of the States Parties to prevent, investigate and punish the human rights violations, and to provide reparation for the consequences of the breaches, as well as in having linked the substantive provisions on the violated rights with the general duty, under Article 1(1) of the Convention, to respect and to ensure respect for the exercise of the rights set forth in the American Convention. This link has been systematically invoked ever since in other cases, by both the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
In Aloeboetoe v Suriname (1993), 47 in which the respondent State had recognized its international responsibility (in 1991), the Court proceeded to the determination of the amount of reparations to be paid to the relatives of the murdered victims or their heirs; furthermore, it ordered the establishment of two trust funds and the creation of a foundation, as well as the reopening of a school located in Gujaba and the functioning of the medical dispensary already in place. The contribution of that Judgment consisted in having determined the reparations due for human rights violations in the social context in which the conventional norms of protection apply, taking sensibly in due account the cultural practices (such as polygamy) in the community of the maroons {saramacas) in Suriname, to which the seven murdered victims belonged.
Violations of the right to life were also found by the Court in the cases Neira Alegria v Peru (1995), 48 Caballero Delgado and Santana v Colombia (1995), 49 and Durandand Ugarte v Peru (2000).
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Such violations were established too in Paniagua Morales and Others v Guatemala (1998) . 51 The case is also important because of the Court's expressions of concern about the prevailing situation of impunity surrounding the acts of the cas d'espece. The Court characterized impunity as 'the total lack of investigation, prosecution, capture, trial and conviction of those responsible for violations of the rights protected by the American Convention, in view of the fact that the State has the obligation to use all the legal means at its disposal to combat that situation, since 45 IACtHR Series C 4; 9 HRLJ 212 (1988). * IACtHR Series C 5. 52 It should not pass unnoticed in this connection that in Blake v Guatemala (reparations, 1999) 53 the first resolutory point of the Court's Judgment consisted in ordering the respondent State to investigate the facts and to identify and punish those responsible and to adopt the necessary measures of domestic law to assure compliance with that obligation. On the same theme, in its historic Judgment in the case concerning Peru of the massacre of Barrios Altos (2001), 54 the Court warned that provisions of amnesty, of prescription and of factors excluding responsibility intended to impede the investigation and punishment of those responsible for grave violations of human rights (such as torture, summary, extra-legal or arbitrary executions, and forced disappearances) are inadmissible; they violate non-derogable rights recognized by the international law of human rights. Laws of self-amnesty, the Court proceeded, impede knowledge of the truth and obstruct access to justice (and the obtaining of reparation), leading to the perpetuation of impunity and rendering the victims defenceless, being thus manifestly incompatible with the letter and spirit of the American Convention. 55 As a consequence of such manifest incompatibility, the Court concluded significantly, those laws have no legal effects and can no longer continue to represent an obstacle to the investigation of the facts and the punishment of those responsible for the human rights violations. 56 Last but not least, in the paradigmatic case of Villagrdn Morales and Others v Guatemala (merits, 1999) 57 (the so-called Street Children case), the Court, in establishing a violation of the right to life under Article 4 of the American Convention, to the detriment of the five murdered adolescents, expressed the opinion that 'owing to the fundamental nature of the right to life, restrictive approaches to it are inadmissible. In essence, the fundamental right to life includes not only the right of every human being not to be deprived of his life arbitrarily, but also the right that he will not be prevented from having access to the conditions that guarantee a dignified existence'. In a Joint Concurring Opinion in that case, it was pointed out that 'the 52 Ibid., para. 173. In another case, that of Carrido and Baigorria v Argentina (reparations, 1998), lACtHR Series C 39; 7 IHRR 70 (2000), in which the respondent State accepted responsibility for the facts, the Court devoted a whole section (section IX) of the Judgment to the State's duty to take action at domestic level to render the Conventional obligations of protection effective. 53 IACtHR Series C 48; 7 IHRR 661 (2000). 54 IACtHR Series C 75 para. 41. 55 Ibid., para. 43. ), 59 the Court, in establishing a violation of Article 5 of the American Convention, stated that certain acts which, in the past, were qualified as 'inhuman and degrading treatment', could, later on, with the passing of time, come to be considered as torture, given that the growing demands for protection 'must be accompanied by a more vigorous response in dealing with infractions of the basic values of democratic societies'. 65 Subsequently, the Court had the occasion to reflect upon the right to a fair trial under the American Convention in its Judgments on the merits in the cases of Loayza Tamayo v Peru (1997) 66 and Sudrez Rosero v Ecuador (1997).
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In the Loayza Tamayo case, the Court declared that the Peruvian decrees-laws which defined the crimes of terrorism and 'traicion a la patria' were incompatible with Article 8(4) of the Convention, in that they were in breach of the principle of non bis in idem set forth therein. This was the first time that the Court held in a contentious case that provisions of domestic law were incompatible with the American Convention.
68 Some days after the Judgment, the respondent State complied with the Court's order to release the prisoner (Mrs. Maria Elena Loayza Tamayo) and, moreover, announced its decision to put an end to the so-called tribunals of 'faceless judges' ('jueces sin rostro') in Peru. 69 Subsequently, in its Judgment in Castillo Petruzzi and Others v Peru (1999), 70 the Court found that the proceedings conducted against the four persons concerned were invalid, as they were incompatible with the American Convention, and, furthermore, ordered that the four imprisoned persons be guaranteed a new trial, in which the guarantees of the due process of law were ensured.
In its Judgment in the Sudrez Rosero case, the Court found the respondent State in breach of the judicial guarantees enshrined in Article 8(1) and (2) The Court added, in the Castillo Pdez case, that 'Article 25 is intimately linked with the general obligation of Article 1(1) of the American Convention, in conferring functions of protection upon the domestic law of States Parties. The remedy of habeas corpus has the purpose of not only guaranteeing personal freedom and integrity, but also preventing the disappearance on indetermination of the place of detention and, ultimately, securing the right to life' itself . 76 Ever since, this has been the position of the Court: in subsequent Judgments, 77 the Court reiterated its significant obiter dictum -now jurisprudence constante -to the effect that Article 25 constitutes one of the basic pillars not only of the American Convention but of the rule of law itself in a democratic society in the sense of the Convention, and is intimately linked to the general obligation of Article 1(1) of the Convention in attributing functions of protection to the domestic law of States Parties.
Freedom of Expression (Article 13 of the Convention)
In the Court's case-law to date, the leading case on freedom of expression is the Court's Judgment on the prohibition in Chile (based on a constitutional provision) of the exhibition of the movie 'The Last Temptation of Christ ' (2001 ) . 78 The Court, recalling the individual and social dimensions of the freedom of expression, pointed out that 'the expression and dissemination of thought and information are indivisible', so that a restriction on the possibilities of dissemination represents directly a limitation to the right to freedom of expression, 79 respect for which is essential to the extension of ideas and information among persons. 80 The individual and social dimensions of that right, the Court added, 'have equal importance' and ought to be simultaneously guaranteed; 'freedom of expression, as a cornerstone of a democratic society, is an essential condition for this latter to be sufficiently informed' . 81 In finding a violation of Article 13 of the Convention, the Court upheld the objective international responsibility of the State, for any act or omission on the part of any of its powers or Ibid 82 The Court, inter alia, determined that the respondent State should, within a reasonable time, modify its domestic law, so as to put an end to prior censorship and allow the exhibition of the movie 'The Last Temptation of Christ' (resolutory point n. 4).
The Right to Property (Article 21 of the Convention)
In its Judgment on the merits in an unprecedented case, that of the Community Mayagna Awas Tingni v Nicaragua (merits, 2001) , 83 the Court's decision protected a whole indigenous community (as the complaining party), and its right to communal property of its lands (under Article 21 of the Convention). The public hearings of the case before the Court were particularly illuminating with regard to the customary law of the indigenous Mayagna Awas Tingni community. In the light of Article 21 of the Convention, the Court determined that the delimitation, demarcation and issuing of the title to the lands of the indigenous Mayagna Awas Tingni community should be undertaken in conformity with its customary law, its uses and its habits.
In reaching this significant decision, the Court took into account the fact that 'among the indigenous persons there exists a communitarian tradition about a communal form of the collective property of the land, in the sense that the ownership of this latter is not centred in an individual but rather in the group and his community...'. The Court also stressed that to 'the indigenous communities the relationship with the land is not merely a question of possession and production but rather a material and spiritual element that they ought to enjoy fully, so as to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations'.
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Reparations: The Concept of the 'Project of Life'
Article 63(1) of the American Convention opens a wide horizon in respect of reparations for violations of the rights protected by it, in referring to other forms of reparation, as well as compensation. 85 The Inter-American Court, accordingly, in its jurisprudence constante, has ordered distinct kinds of reparations, stressing the respondent States' obligations to take positive measures (obligaciones de hacer) 82 Ibid., para. 72-3. In the cas d'espece, the origin of the breach was found in Article 19(12) of the national Constitution, which established the prior censorship of cinematographic production. On the Court's upholding of the objective international responsibility of the State, cf. also the Concurring Opinion of Judge Cancado Trindade (paras. 1-40). It is noteworthy that, although drawing upon the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights when deciding whether the censorship in this case could be justified as being 'for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence' (Article 13(4)), the Court did not make use of the European Court's 'margin of appreciation' doctrine. This is in accord with the Inter-American Court's general approach of not using such a doctrine. 83 IACtHR Series C 79. w Ibid., para. 141. 85 Article 63(2) reads: 'It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.' also in that regard. In several recent cases, the Court has drawn attention to the importance of non-pecuniary reparations and has paid due attention to the rehabilitation of the surviving victims and their relatives.
One aspect of its rich case-law in this regard, which deserves to be singled out, is the Court's jurisprudential construction of the concept of the 'project of life' (proyecto de vida). In its Judgment in Loayza Tamayo v Peru (reparations, 1998), 86 the Court for the first time pronounced on the concept of the project of life, linked to that of satisfaction, among other measures of reparation. The Court noted that the complaint of damage to the project of life 'is definitely not the same as the immediate and direct harm to a victim's assets', but rather seeks to fulfil 'the full self-actualisation of the person concerned'. 87 The Court found that the circumstances in which the detention of the victim had taken place caused a damage to her project of life.
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To the Court, the project of life 'is akin to the concept of personal fulfilment, which in turn is based on the options that an individual may have for leading his life and achieving the goal that he sets for himself. Strictly speaking, those options are the manifestation and guarantee of freedom. An individual can hardly be described as truly free if he does not have options to pursue in life and to carry that life to its natural conclusion. Those options, in themselves, have an important existential value. Hence, their elimination or curtailment objectively abridges freedom and constitutes the loss of a valuable asset, a loss that this Court cannot disregard' . 89 The Court returned to its consideration of the concept of the project of life in its Judgment on the merits in the 'Street Children 1 case (Villagrdn Morales and Others v Guatemala, 1999). 90 More recently, in Cantoral Benavides v Peru (reparations, 2001), 91 the Court, inter alia, decided (resolutory point n. 6) that the State ought to grant the complainant -a victim of torture -the means to undertake and conclude his (interrupted) studies of university or superior level in a centre of recognised academic quality. This determination by the Court of the damage to the project of life of the complainant, as well as of the need to provide reparation for it, constitutes a form of satisfaction, conducive to the rehabilitation of the victim. Ibid., para. 147. 88 Ibid., paras. 147-54. 89 Ibid., para. 148. In a Joint Concurring Opinion in the Loayza Tamayo case (reparations, 1998) supra note 86, it was noted that "the project of life encompasses fully the ideal of the American Declaration [of Human Rights] of 1948 of proclaiming the spiritual development as the supreme end and the highest expression of human existence. The damage to the project of life threatens, ultimately, the very meaning which each human person attributes to her existence. When this occurs, a damage is caused to what is most intimate in the human being: this is a damage endowed with an autonomy of its own, which affects the spiritual meaning of life". Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Cancado Trindade and Abreu Burelli, para. 16, and compare also para. 10. 
Procedural Aspects
Access to Justice at the International Level
The central question of the individual's access to justice at the international level has been the object of attention in the case-law of the Inter-American Court, with regard both to the importance of the right of individual petition under the American Convention, as well as the conditions of admissibility of individual complaints. In its Judgment in Castillo Petruzzi and Others v Peru (preliminary objections, 1998), 93 the Court upheld the integrity of the right of individual petition (challenged by the respondent State) under the American Convention (Article 44) in the circumstances of the case. It drew attention to the importance of that right, observing that the broad faculty 'to make a complaint is a characteristic feature of the system for the international protection of human rights'. 94 In a Concurring Opinion, it was observed that 'without the right of individual petition, and the consequent access to justice at international level, the rights enshrined into the American Convention would be reduced to a little more than dead letter'; thus, the right of individual petitionrendering the protected rights effective -constituted 'a fundamental clause (cldusula petrea)' upon which was erected 'the juridical mechanism of emancipation of the human being vis-a-vis his own State for the protection of his rights in the ambit of the International Law of Human Rights'. 95 The other aspect of the question of the access of the individual to justice at international level that is dealt with in the case-law of the Court pertains to the conditions of admissibility of individual complaints.
In its earlier case-law, 96 the Court used to admit the re-opening and re-examination by the Court of an objection of pure admissibility, favouring the respondent party, when this should have been definitively resolved by the Inter-American Commission. Just as the Commission's decisions of inadmissibility are final, so should its decisions of admissibility be: either all decisions -of admissibility or otherwise -should be allowed to be reopened before the Court, or they should all be kept exclusive to the Commission. To allow for a reopening or review by the Court of a decision on admissibility by the Commission 97 created an unbalance between the parties, favouring the respondent States. In Gangaram Panday v Suriname (preliminary objections, 1991) 98 the Court came to admit that, if an objection of non-exhaustion of local remedies is not raised in limine litis, it is tacitly waived. But it was necessary for the Court to go further than that, since, if the respondent State waived the objection of non-exhaustion of local remedies by not raising it in limine litis, in the prior procedure 93 IACtHR Series C 41; 7 IHRR 101 (2000). * Ibid., para. 77. 95 Concurring Opinion of Judge Cancado Trindade, paras. 35-6. 96 As from its decisions on preliminary objections in the cases Velasquez Rodriguez and Codi'nez Cruz v Honduras (1987).
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As the Court upheld in the aforementioned Honduran cases. before the Commission, it would be inconceivable that it could freely withdraw that waiver in the subsequent procedure before the Court (estoppel/forclusion) by raising the objection again. This is precisely what happened in the Loayza Tamayo" and Castillo Pdez' 00 cases (preliminary objections, 1996), concerning Peru, where the Court, reorienting its case-law, took the important step of rightly determining that, if the respondent State failed to invoke the preliminary objection of non-exhaustion of local remedies in the proceedings on admissibility before the Commission, it was precluded from invoking it subsequently before the Court (estoppel). 101 In this way, the Court redressed the earlier unbalance to the detriment of the complainants, fostering the procedural position of the individuals in the proceedings under the American Convention.
The Basis of International Jurisdiction
Shortly after the Court's Judgment in Castillo Petruzzi and Others v Peru, 101 the respondent State (under the Presidency of Mr. Alberto Fujimori) announced the 'withdrawal' of its instrument of acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, with 'immediate effects'. In its two Judgments on competence of 24 September 1999, in the Constitutional Court case 103 and the case of Ivcher Bronstein v Peru, m the Inter-American Court, in asserting its competence to adjudicate on those cases, declared inadmissible the intended 'withdrawal' by the respondent State of its contentious jurisdiction with 'immediate effects'. The Court warned that its competence could not be conditioned by acts distinct from those of its own. It added that, in recognising its contentious jurisdiction, a State accepts the prerogative of the Court to decide on any question affecting its competence, being unable, later on, to attempt to withdraw suddenly from it, as that would undermine the whole international mechanism of protection.
The Court observed that there exist unilateral acts of the States which are completed by themselves, in an autonomous way (such as the recognition of a State or government, diplomatic protest, promise, renunciation), and unilateral acts performed in the ambit of the law of treaties, governed and conditioned by the latter (such as ratification, reservations, acceptance of the clause of contentious jurisdiction of an international tribunal). The unilateral act under consideration in the present case fell within the latter category. The American Convention cannot be at the mercy of limitations not provided for by it, imposed suddenly by a State Party for reasons of domestic order. The American Convention does not foresee the unilateral withdrawal of a clause, and even less of a clause of the importance of the one which provides for the acceptance of the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. The sole
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possibility which the American Convention foresees is that of the denunciation (of the Convention as a whole), with the observance of a 12-month lapse of time, and without comprising facts prior to the denunciation. This is the same lapse of time set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. This is an imperative of juridical security, which ought to be rigorously observed in the interest of all States Parties.
The Court proceeded, thus, with its examination of the pending contentious cases against the Peruvian State, and it could not have been otherwise: this is a duty incumbent upon it, under the American Convention, as an autonomous judicial organ of the international protection of human rights. The respondent State had undertaken an international engagement from which it could not, all of a sudden, withdraw in its own terms. The purported unilateral 'withdrawal' with 'immediate effects' of the respondent State had no juridical foundation, neither in the American Convention, nor in the law of treaties, nor in general international law. The intended 'withdrawal', besides being unfounded, would have brought about the ruin, to the detriment of all States Parties to the American Convention, of the inter-American system of protection as a whole, constructed with so much effort along the last decades. The Court then decided, in conclusion, that the intended 'withdrawal' of the respondent State was 'inadmissible'.
With its important decision in those cases, the Court safeguarded the integrity of the American Convention, which, as the other human rights treaties, bases its application on the collective guarantee in the operation of the international mechanism of protection. The Court's aforementioned Judgments, in the Constitutional Court case and the case of Ivcher Bronstein v Peru, contributed ultimately to enhance the foundation of its jurisdiction in contentious matters.
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With the subsequent change in government in the country, the Peruvian State rendered 'without effects' the earlier purported 'withdrawal' from the Court's competence, and 'normalised' its relations with the latter (on 9 February 2001), 106 complying with the Court's Judgments. The basis of the Court's jurisdiction in contentious matters came also to the fore in Hilaire, Benjamin, and Constantine v Trinidad and Tobago (preliminary objections, 2001) . 108 The respondent State had interposed a preliminary objection, of a kind not expressly foreseen in Article 62 of the American Convention, which, in the Court's assessment, 'would lead to a situation in which the Court would have as first parameter of reference the Constitution of the State and only subsidiarily the American Convention, a situation which would bring about a fragmentation of the international legal order of protection of human rights and would render illusory the object and purpose of the American Convention'.
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This was clearly unacceptable. As the Court, furthermore, observed, 'the instrument of acceptance on the part of Trinidad and Tobago, of the contentious jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 110 does not fit into the hypotheses foreseen in Article 62(2) of the Convention. It has a general scope, which ends up by subordinating totally the application of the American Convention to the domestic law of Trinidad and Tobago pursuant to what its national tribunals decide. All this implies that this instrument of acceptance is manifestly incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention' (para. 88). On the basis of this conclusion as to the rationale of Article 62(2) of the American Convention (numerus clausus), the Court retained jurisdiction to adjudicate on the Hilaire, Benjamin, and Constantine cases, and safeguarded the integrity of its own jurisdictional basis in particular, and of the mechanism of protection under the American Convention as a whole.
1 " where a significant friendly settlement was reached before the Court, satisfactory to all concerned.
CASE-LAW PERTAINING TO PROVISIONAL MEASURES OF PROTECTION
Under Article 63(2) of the American Convention, the Inter-American Court can also order the Provisional Measures of Protection that it may deem pertinent, in cases of extreme gravity and urgency and in order to avoid irreparable damage to persons. It may do so -and it has in fact done so -in relation both to pending cases and to cases which have not yet been submitted to it, upon request of the Commission. Such measures have gained a growing importance in the case-law of the Court in recent years; they disclose the preventive dimension of the international protection of human rights, and represent a true jurisdictional guarantee of preventive character in the international safeguard of the fundamental rights of the human person. The great majority of the petitions for provisional measures have been admitted and ordered by the Inter-American Court, in relation both to cases pending before itself, as well as to cases not yet submitted to it, at the request of the Commission.
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Before ordering provisional measures of protection, the Court always verifies if the State at issue has recognised (under Article 62(2) of the Convention) as obligatory its competence in contentious matters. The Provisional Measures of Protection have been ordered in practice in cases implying mainly an imminent threat to the life or the integrity of the person. 119 In various requests for such measures on the part of the Commission in cases not yet pending before the Court, the latter has deemed applicable the presumption that such measures of protection are necessary. The Court has, in practice, not required from the Commission substantial evidence that the facts are true, but proceeded rather on the basis of the reasonable presumption (prima facie evidence) that this is the case. Until recently, the Provisional Measures ordered by the Inter-American Court, or the Urgent Measures dictated by its President, have effectively protected fundamental rights, essentially the right to life and the right to personal (physical, mental and moral) integrity. But now other rights are being protected as well; this is not surprising, as all human rights are interrelated and indivisible, there being, juridically and epistemologically, no impediment for them to be ordered so as to safeguard other human rights, whenever the pre-conditions of the extreme gravity and urgency and of the prevention of irreparable damages to persons, set forth in Article 63(2) of the American Convention, are met.
More than 1500 persons (petitioners or witnesses) have been protected to date by the measures ordered by the Inter-American Court, or its President, which reveals their extraordinary importance. On one occasion, in James and Others v Trinidad and Tobago (1999), 120 the measures ordered by the Court (for suspension of the execution of sentences imposing the death penalty) gave rise to significant considerations of a doctrinal order. On another occasion, in the case of the newspaper "La Nation " v Costa Rica (2001), 121 on freedom of expression, the Court ordered the suspension of the execution of a sentence of a national tribunal against a journalist. In its resolutions on Provisional Measures, the Inter-American Court, besides the adoption of such measures, has also required the State to report to it periodically with information on their implementation, and the Commission to present to the Court its observations on the State reports. This has enabled the Court itself to exert a continuous monitoring of the compliance, on the part of the States at issue, with its own Provisional Measures of Protection.
Recently, a significant new development has taken place in two cases concerning collectivities of people. In the first one, that of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic (2000) , 122 the Court adopted Provisional Measures intended, inter alia, to protect the lives and personal integrity of five individuals, to avoid the deportation or expulsion of two of them, to allow the immediate return to the Dominican Republic of two others, and the family reunification of two of them with their children, besides the investigation of the facts. By means of this Provisional Measure, which represents the embryo of an international habeas corpus, the Court for the first time thus extended protection to new rights (in addition to the fundamental rights to life and personal integrity) under the American Convention.
Shortly afterwards, in the case of the Community of Peace of San Jose ofApartado v Colombia (2000) , 123 the full Court ratified the Urgent Measures ordered by its President in favour of the members of a 'Community of Peace' in Colombia, and required the State, inter alia, to secure the necessary conditions for the displaced members of that community to return to their homes.
The Provisional Measures of Protection ordered by the Court in those two cases, in the course of the year 2000, are of particular importance, as they greatly enlarge the circle of protected persons. Recently (resolution of 18 June 2002), the Court, in expanding the Measures of Protection in the Community case, extending them also to persons who render services to that Community, pointed out the duty of the State to protect the life and personal integrity of all persons under protection of the measures vis-a-vis third parties (notably clandestine groups and paramilitary). In this way, the Inter-American Court, it is submitted, acknowledged the pressing need of developing the obligations erga omnes of protection in the framework of the American Convention on Human Rights.
The position of individuals seeking protection has been lately strengthened by means of another development. In the Constitutional Court case (2000) , 124 concerning Peru, one of the three Judges dismissed from that Court lodged directly with the Inter-American Court a request for Interim Measures of Protection. As the case was pending before the Inter-American Court (which was then not in session), its President adopted Urgent Measures, ex officio (on 7 April 2000), for the first time in the Court's history, in order to avoid irreparable damage to the petitioner. The same situation occurred in the case Loayza Tamayo v Peru (2000, then under supervision for execution of the Sentence). In both cases {Constitutional Court and Loayza Tamayo), the full Court ratified the Urgent Measures ordered by its President. These two recent episodes illustrate the importance of the direct access of the petitioners to the Court, even more forcefully in a situation of extreme gravity and urgency.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
In the case-law of the Inter-American Court, as in the domain of the International Law of Human Rights as a whole, there has been a clear emphasis, in the process of interpretation of human rights treaties, on the element of the object and purpose of such treaties, so as to ensure an effective protection {effet utile) of the guaranteed rights. Early in its history, the Inter-American Court stressed the special character of human rights treaties (as distinguished from multilateral treaties of the traditional type), 125 and further emphasised the objective character of the obligations set forth in the American Convention. 126 The findings of the Court 127 reinforce the necessarily restrictive interpretation of restrictions (limitations and derogations) to the exercise of guaranteed rights. 128 Furthermore, the Court's interpretation of the American Convention has been evolutive or dynamic, so as to respond to the new needs of protection. Thus, in its historical sixteenth Advisory Opinion on the Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law (1999), 129 for example, the Court stated that 'human rights treaties are living instruments, whose interpretation ought to follow the evolution of times and the current conditions of life'. 130 In that Opinion, the Court made it clear that in its interpretation of the norms of the Convention it should aim at extending protection in new situations on the basis of pre-existing rights. The same line of evolutive or dynamic interpretation was followed by the Court in, for example, its Judgment on the merits in Cantoral Benavides v Peru (2000). Of great importance is the Inter-American Court's firm position in tackling key issues of interpretation and application of the American Convention, such as the right of individual petition 132 and the basis of its own jurisdiction in contentious matters. 133 The Court pointed out that these issues pertained to conventional clauses of fundamental relevance (cldusulas petreas) of the international protection of human rights, and warned that any attempt to undermine them would threaten the functioning of the whole mechanism of protection under the American Convention, being thus inadmissible.
The aforementioned Court's decisions regarded those provisions (on the right of individual petition and on the recognition of its compulsory jurisdiction) as constituting the basic pillars of the mechanism whereby the emancipation of the individual vis-a-vis his own State is achieved. 134 The case-law of the Inter-American
